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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
JEANNE ALEXINE JENKINS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
8276

JOHN ALLEN JENKINS and VERONICA JENKINS,
Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Since we do not entirely concur in appellants' statement of the facts, we shall restate them as concisely as is
consistent with our desire to give the court a complete view
of the issues and of the questions involved for determination. For purposes of convenience, respondent shall be referred to as plaintiff and appellants referred to as defendants. Unless otherwise indicated, we shall refer only to
the defendant, John Allen Jenkins, since, as indicated in
defendants' brief (Pg. 1), the defendant, Veronica Jenkins,
is only a nominal party.
FACTS
Plaintiff -and defendant were formerly residents of
San Diego County, California. While residing there, they
ran into matrimonial difficulties and plaintiff filed a com-
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plaint in the Superior Court of the State of California in
and for the County of San Diego, (hereinafter referred to
as the California court) seeking a divorce from the defendant and the custody of their two minor children involved
in this action, to-wit: Theodore Scott Jenkins and Mia
Jenkins. Defendant duly filed his voluntary appearance
therein and waived further notice of the proceedings (TR.
4). Pursuant to the complaint of the plaintiff, an interlocutory decree of divorce was entered on the 9th day of
March, 1953, granting to plaintiff a divorce and custody
of said two minor children ( TR. 4) . Shortly thereafter,
plaintiff, by reason of a physical injury, requested the
defendant to take care of the children pending her recovery
and on or about the 5th day of May, 1953, defendant did
in fact take said two children. Thereafter, plaintiff recovered from her injuries and requested defendant to return the children to her. On or about March 20, 1954, defendant advised plaintiff that he had remarried and had
no intention of surrendering custody of said two minor
children. Whereupon, plaintiff instigated the present proceedings in the District Court of Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, by filing her complaint for a writ of habeas corpus
(TR. 1-3). Pursuant to the prayer of the complaint, a writ
of habeas corpus was issued commanding the defendant
to appear before the court and to bring with him said
minor children (TR. 7). The hearing on the writ of habeas
corpus came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable
Judge Lewis Jones on the 22nd day of June, 1954, at which
time the court made the following statement:
"THE COURT: Gentlemen, the Clerk sent me
the files and I've read the pleadings. I think I'll
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require a statement of the theory of the parties, in
the nature of a pretrial, before we commence, because this may or may not be able to be settled. I
don't mean ultimately settled, but the matter of why
the parties are here rather than down in the Superior Court of San Diego County is a very pressing
thing to the court. Irregardless of Cook vs. Cook
and other cases, I'd like to discuss the law before
we take any evidence. I don't mean by that that we
can settle the matter, but we might hurdle something" (TR. 21).
Pages 21 through 45 of the record on appeal discloses
what transpired between counsel and the court pursuant
to the foregoing suggestion and was termed by the court
as pre-trial statements and oral stipulation of counsel (TR.
16). Pursuant to the discussions between court and counsel,
the parties entered into a stipulation which was summarized
by the court as follows:
"THE COURT: Then to see if I can summarize
this, the parties appear and make a pretrial statement and stipulate the matter may be continued, the
court to retain jurisdiction of the children until
such time as an order is obtained by either party.
That is, a ne~v order from the Superior Court of San
Diego. That order could be either an order denying
a petition to modify or granting a petition. And at
that time, upon being advised of the action of the
Superior Court of San Diego County, this court will
then make its written order directing-or granting
the writ if you prevail down in San Diego, and denying the writ if you prevail, Mr. Gustin. Is that
the understanding now, so that the parties won't
have to come back?" (TR. 44). (Italics added.)
Pursuant to said stipulation, the defendant filed a petition in the California court asking that court to modify the
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original divorce decree and to grant to him the custody of
said minor children. Both parties entered their appearance
in said cause and were. duly represented by counsel. On
Sept~mber 22, 1954, after a full hearing, said California
court made and entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order denying defendant's petition to modify
said final decree of divorce and ordering the defendant to
immediately return said children to the plaintiff on the
grounds and for the reasons: "That Theodore Scott Jenkins and Mia Jenkins are of young and tender years, being
approximately six and four years of age respectively; that
it is for the best interests of said minor children that they
be in the care, custody and control of their natural mother,
the plaintiff, Jeanne Alexine Jenkins", and "That there
has not been any change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a· modification of the interlocutory and final decree of
divorce with respect to the care, custody and control of said
two minor children." (Pl. ex. 4, Pages 3 and 4.) Said
California court also found as a 1natter of fact: "That the
plaintiff Jeanne Alexine Jenkins has recovered from any
physical or mental disabilities which may have existed during the period from February, 1953, to July, 1953; that
said disabilities are not likely to reoccur; that the plaintiff
is a fit and proper person to have the care, custody and
control of the minor children, Theodore Scott Jenkins and
Mia Jenkins (PI. Ex. 4, Page 3) .
Thereafter, defendant filed a notice of appeal to the
Supreme Court of the State of California, which appeal is
now pending. On October 7, 1954, in accordance with the
stipulation entered into by the parties, plaintiff filed and
served a motion requesting the District Court of Salt Lake
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County to enter its order granting the writ of habeas corpus basing said motion upon the order of the California
court ( TR. 17-20) . Said motion came on for hearing on
the 14th day of October, 1954, before the Honorable Lewis
Jones, who presided over the hearing on June 22, 1954.
Pages 57 to 85 of the record on appeal discloses what
transpired between counsel and the court at that time. Defendant' s counsel during the course of the discussion and
in referring to the stipulation entered into by and between
the parties on June 22, 1954, made the following statement:
"This stipulation is a matter that is between Your Honor
and myself. Your Honor's conclusion as to what was stipulated to is, of course,. the last word so far as I am concerned and so far as my clients are concerned. I don't intend to let anybody else interpret or review the stipulation
that was made between counsel and the court" (TR. 58).
Thereafter, plaintiff introduced into evidence certified copies of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
of the California Court which were admitted without objection by defendant (TR. 64). Thereafter, the court gave
defendant an opportunity of getting into the record such
additional matters of evidence as he desired (TR. 73-74-75).
Thereafter, the court, pursuant to the stipulation of the
parties granted the writ of habeas corpus and forthwith
returned said children to the plaintiff, but ordered, however, that she not leave the State of Utah until 12 :00 o'clock
noon, October 16, 1954, and not then if the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah or any justice thereof ordered otherwise (TR. 52). Thereafter, defendant filed his notice of
appeal to this court and filed a motion in the Supreme Court
for an order staying the proceedings in the District Court
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pending the determination of the appeal. The motion for
a stay came on for hearing before the Honorable F. Henri
Henriod, Justice of this court, in his chambers on October
16, 1954, at which time he entered an order directing the
plaintiff to immediately return the children to the defendant and prohibiting either party from taking the children
from the State of Utah pending the determination of this
appeal.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT NO. 1
THE ONLY JUSTICIABL,E ISSUES EXISTING
BETWEEN THE PARTIES WERE AT THE
INSTANCE AND REQUEST OF THE DEFENDANT AND BY STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE LOWER
COURT REMOVED TO AND SUBMITTED FOR
FINAL DETERMINATION BY THE CALIFORNIA COURT, WHICH COURT AT ALL
TIMES HAD AND WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE
JURISDICTION OVER THE PARTIES AND
THE SUBJECT MATTER.
POINT NO.2
THE JURISDICTION OF' THE CALIFORNIA
COURT HAVING BEEN VOLUNTARILY AND
PROPERLY INVOKED BY THE PARTIES
WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE LOWER
COURT, THE CALIFORNIA COURT'S ORDERS
AND DECREE ARE ENTITLED TO FULL
FAITH AND CREDIT IN THIS STATE.
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ARGUMENT
POINT NO. 1
THE ONLY JUSTICIABLE ISSUES EXISTING
BETWEEN THE PARTIES WERE AT THE
INSTANCE AND REQUEST OF THE DEFENDANT AND BY STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE LOWER
COURT REMOVED TO AND SUBMITTED FOR
FINAL DETERMINATION BY THE CALIFORNIA COURT, WHICH COURT AT ALL
TIMES HAD AND WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE
JURISDICTION OVER THE PARTIES AND
THE SUBJECT MATTER.
Plaintiff is in accord with defendant's statement in
his brief, page 12, "That the best interest and welfare of
the children is the controlling factor and is the rule adopted
by this court in child custody cases when not controlled by
statute." We contend, however, in answer to his question:
"Has the rule been applied and followed in the instant
case?" that it has.
There is no question but that the California court has
and at all times will continue to have jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter (27 C. J. S. 322 (c) page
1246, 27 C. J. S. 333 (c) page 1299 ; Sampsell vs. Superior
Court (Cal.), 197 P. 2d 739). Nor is it disputed that the
best interest of said children would be served by invoking
the California court's jurisdiction as evidenced by the
statement of defendant's counsel made during the course of
the proceedings held on June 22, 1954, to-wit: "Now, I can
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see, Your Honor, that the orderly sensible, practical thing
to do would be for these parties to go down to California
where the court had jurisdiction of the matrimonial domicile of the parties" ( TR. 33) , and again : "There is another fact, Your Honor, looking at the best interests of the
children. It isn't to their best interests that a record be
made that is so fleeting and temporary in this court of the
kind that will have to be made. It ought to be down there
in the California court" (TR. 35).
Because the lower court (TR. 35) and the plaintiff
( TR. 45) were of the same opinion, the parties entered into
a stipulation, the effect of which was to submit the justiciable issues existing between the parties to the California
court for a final determination. The parties having submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the California
court, they are now bound by its order denying the petition
of defendant to modify the decree of divorce. As we read
defendant's brief, he does dispute· this contention, but merely contends that the applicable rule of law in California is:
"A perfected appeal in an action for the custody of a child
automatically constitutes a stay of proceedings and precludes a trial court from interfering with custody as it
existed at the time of the appeal" (Defendant's Brief, Page
14). Plaintiff agrees wi_th defendant that the foregoing is
the rule of law applicable to child custody cases in the State
of California, but we cannot agree with defendant in his
application and interpretation of the rule as he would have
this court apply it to the facts of this case.
In the more recent case of Ex parte Robelet (Cal.),
263 P. 2d 486, the wife was granted a final decree of divorce
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from the father and awarded custody of their two minor
children, ages 11 and 10. She did not take physical custody
of the children because of a serious physical and mental
illness and upon the advice of her physician. While the
children were in the physical custody of the father, heapplied for and obtained an order modifying the custody provisions of the original decree granting to him the physical
custody of the children with visitation rights granted to the
mother. Shortly thereafter and while the children were
with the mother under the visitation provisions of the modification order, she applied for an order to change the
custody of the children to herself. Following a hearing on
her application, the court further modified the custody
provisions of the· decree and awarded the physical custody.
of the children to the mother. The father immediately filed
a notice of appeal and pending said appeal filed a petition
for habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of the State of
California contending that his appeal stayed the last modification order, and that, therefore, he was entitled to custody
of the children pending the appeal. The matter vvas referred to the District Court of Appeal, Second District,
Division One, California,- by the Supreme Court. The District Court of Appeals reaffirmed the rule of law quoted
by the defendant in his brief (Page 14) and further held:
"At the present time there is no showing that the children
may not safely remain with. the father pending the appeal.
By reason of the foregoing, it is ordered that the children
be delivered to the petitioner (father), who, pending determination of the appeal, is entitled to the custody pursuant to the terms of the Superior Court order of October
3, 1952," which order was the first modification order
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granting to him custody of the two minor children. Thus,
applying the rule of law of ex parte Robelet, supra, plaintiff is entitled to the custody of the two minor children
pending the appeal in California by reason of the terms of
the final decree of divorce entered by the California court
on March 9, 1954 (TR. 6), and, therefore, the District
Court of Salt Lake County, in granting the writ of habeas
corpus and delivering the physical custody of the children
to the plaintiff forthwith, gave effect to the stipulation
and intent of the parties and committed no error in the
absence of any allegation or evidence offered on behalf of
the defendant to show that the best interest of the children
was not thereby served.
POINT N0.-2
'fHE JURISDICTION OF THE CALIFORNIA

COURT HAVING BEEN VOLUNTARILY AND
PROPERLY INVOKED BY THE PARTIES
WITH TliE APPROVAL OF THE LOWER
COURT, THE CALIFORNIA COURT'S ORDERS
AND DECREE ARE ENTITLED TO FULL
FAITH AND CREDIT IN THIS STATE.
The parties having rightfully and properly submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the California court, which
court has and at all times will continue to have jurisdiction
over the parties and the subject matter, and that court
having found:
"8. That the plaintiff, JEANNE ALEXINE
JENKINS, has recovered from any physical or mental disabilities which may have existed during the
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period from February, 1953, to July, 1953, that said
disabilities are not likely to reoccur; that the plaintiff is a fit and proper person to have the care,
custody, and control of the minor children, THEODORE SCOTT JENKINS and MIA JENKINS", and
"9. That THEODORE SCOTT JENKINS and
MIA JENKINS are of young and tender years, being approximately 6 and 4 years of age, respectively;
that it is for the best interests of said minor children that they be in the care, custody, and control
of their natural mother, the plaintiff, JEANNE
ALEXINE JENKINS", and
"10. That there has not been any change of
circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification
of the Interlocutory and Final Decrees of Divorce
with respect to the care, custody, and control of said
two minor children", and
"11. That the minor children, THEODORE
SCOTT JENKINS and MIA JENKINS, should be
immediately returned by defendant to the home of
the plaintiff in San Francisco, California." (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, Pages 3-4.)
Its order entered on the 22nd day of September, 1954 (TR.
19), ordering the defendant to immediately deliver said
minor children to the home of the plaintiff is entitled to
full faith and credit in this state in the absence of any facts
or conditions arising subsequent to the date of the decree
which would justify a change in the interest of the children
(Sampsell vs. Holt, 115 Utah 73, 202 P. 2d 550). The defendant having been given the opportunity to offer any
evidence he desired as to why the California court's order
should not be enforced (TR. 67, 73, 75), and having failed
to show or allege any change in circumstances since the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
entry of the California court's order on September 22, 1954,
the rule of law of SampseU vs. Holt, supra, was binding
upon the lower court and, therefore, it was not error for
said court to grant to plaintiff the immediate custody of
said children.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the appeal of the
defendant should be forthwith dismissed and the order
entered by the Honorable F. Henri Henriod, justice of this
court, be vacated and set aside, and that the defendants be
ordered to return the custody of said two minor children
to the plaintiff in conformity with the order of the District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and the decrees
and order of the Superior Court of the State of California
in and for the county of San Diego.
Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM R. INGEBRETSEN, of
RAY, RAWLINS, JONES
& HENDERSON,
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

